Privacy as Seclusion

Jason M. Pittman, Sc.D.

I think privacy needs to end. To end it, we first must know what privacy is. Recall that we started with non-intrusion as a possible interpretation. Now, we examine seclusion of information as the second of five constructs that may explain what privacy is.

Seclusion is an interesting construct. First, seclusion is the only construct to be a direct synonym for privacy. In contrast, the other four constructs are characteristics of information. Moreover, seclusion is the only construct that implies something done to or with information. That is, we seclude information. We can place information into seclusion which implies a state of being.

Seclusion can also be a state of mind. Here, we can imagine the form of seclusion experienced when one is physically in a group but not part of that group. I suspect that simply ignoring the group is not always a mechanism of seclusion. More so, ignoring does not meaningfully explain how. Further, particularly in modern life, the distractions are too severe to achieve seclusion in this manner.

Seclusion is something that requires premeditation, focus, energy, and effort. The individual must be active in maintaining seclusion; he or she must continually choose to remain secluded. More specifically, the individual engaging in mental seclusion resists the attempts of the group to engage to the point of seemingly not being present. At the same time, such an individual does not engage with the group or another individual in the group in any manner. In effect, the individual is mentally distant in much the same way that one is physically distant in our camping explanation earlier.

Certainly this mind-state form of seclusion is more applicable to information privacy. That is, information, as a mental construct, is made private through seclusion in the same way that the individual makes himself secluded mentally. Thus, not only is privacy (as seclusion) a decision but an ongoing decision to resist externalized intrusion. Privacy in this case is not affected by moving information into seclusion as much as it is affected by not allowing information to be moved.

There are three points here that I wish to raise. First, we seem unable to make information private from the self. There is nothing we can do to seclude information away from our own mind. Second, we equally seem incapable of secluding information possessed by another individual or group. A third point, which I find particularly interesting, is that a secluded state of mind can be enforced by the group on the individual, as opposed to self-selected. Social groups behave in this manner by shunning the outcast for example. Likewise, a group locked in status quo will naturally resist the outsider seeking to unbalance the homeostatic social contract.

Overall, seclusion feels more complete as an explanation of privacy than just non-intrusion. Still, the two constructs combined are more consistent than either singularly. Moreover, there seems to be a direction to the relationship between non-intrusion and seclusion. Perhaps the remaining three constructs will illuminate such a relationship further.